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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS PARRISH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f). These sections allow a defendant in a circuit 
court criminal action to take appeal from a final order for 
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. 
Case No. 930770-CA 
(Priority 2) 
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TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 states: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) states: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
... 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608(b) states: 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
• • • 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness7 credibility, other than conviction of 
a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may however, in the discretion of 
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Is defendant's prior conviction for disorderly conduct 
admissible under URE 404(b) for impeachment purposes? 
II. Is the defendant's prior conviction for disorderly conduct a 
proper subject of cross-examination under URE 608(b) for 
impeachment purposes? 
III. Did the probative value of defendant's prior conviction 
outweigh any unfair prejudice to the defendant? 
IV. Even if the admission of the prior conviction was error, was 
it harmless? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are 
questions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991). 
When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probative 
value versus unfair prejudice of evidence, an appellate court will 
only reverse if the trial court's decision was unreasonable as a 
matter of law. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City is satisfied with the statement of the case as 
offered by the defendant. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City is satisfied with the statement of facts as offered 
by the defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under URE 404(b), the prior conviction of the defendant is 
admissible for impeachment purposes. The conviction is also 
admissible under URE 608(b). Both provisions allow prior 
misconduct evidence or prior conviction evidence as impeachment of 
a defendant's testimony. 
The trial court acted reasonably in determining that the 
probative value of the prior conviction outweighed the danger for 
unfair prejudice in allowing its admission for impeachment 
purposes. 
Additionally, even if it were error to admit the prior 
conviction/ it \jas harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct was 
admissible under URE 404(b) for impeachment purposes. 
As a general rule, evidence of prior acts of misconduct of an 
accused are not admissible to show conformity with the prior acts. 
4 
URE 404(b). Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence unless it fits 
an exception; rather it allows admission of relevant evidence other 
than to show merely the general disposition of the defendant. 
Additionally, if a defendant opens up the subject as to prior 
incidents, it becomes subject to cross-examination and refutation 
the same as any other evidence. State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483 
(1981), O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Lopez, the defendant was charged with second degree murder 
for the death of an individual he had fought with outside a bar. 
The testimony of the state's witness was that Lopez had kicked the 
victim in the head while he lay on the ground, fracturing his skull 
and resulting in his death. Defendant denied kicking the victim in 
the head. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked about the 
details of an earlier fight with a man named Waltz that led to the 
incident with the defendant. Specifically, the prosecutor asked 
Lopez if he had kicked Waltz in the head. The question raised an 
objection by defense counsel, which was overruled, and Lopez 
answered no. The state then presented a witness who testified that 
she saw the defendant kick Waltz while he lay on the ground. 
Defendant claimed the testimony about the earlier kick was in 
violation of Rule 551 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Court 
1
 This rule has since been replaced with Rule 404(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, patterned after the Federal Rule. Former 
Rule 55 read: 
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed a 
crime or a civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rule 45 and 48, such 
5 
rejected this claim. In analyzing the applicable rules, the court 
found that Lopez had opened up the subject of the prior fight and 
that this allowed the state the opportunity to question Lopez about 
the earlier incident. The court also noted that, because the 
state's witness and Lopez were in direct conflict with their 
testimony about a kick to the victim's head, credibility was the 
critical question in the case. Given this, "there is no 
impropriety in receiving evidence bearing upon the credibility of 
the witness." Lopez at 486. 
In the case presently before the court, as in Lopez, it was 
the defendant's denial of certain evidence that opened the door to 
the city's questioning concerning the prior incident. On direct 
examination, Parrish indicated that "he expected" to be arrested 
and that it was "not the first time that's happened." Transcript 
(T.) at p.19, line (1.) 16. On cross-examination, he indicated 
that he'd been arrested three times in as many months, in response 
to the question "why did you expect to be arrested." T. at p.20, 
I. 18,19. Then, on re-direct examination, Counsel for Parrish 
asked "at any time have you ever beaten your wife?". T at 21, 1. 
II. Parrish denied he had. 
The denial of Parrish on this question put the prior 
conviction squarely in issue. In the exchange prior to the court's 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other 
material fact including absence of mistake or accident, 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge 
or identity. 
The similarities between the Current 404 and former rule 55 
are obvious. 
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ruling on the objection, the prosecutor clearly stated the evidence 
was intended to show that Parrish had not been truthful with the 
court. T. at p. 22 1. 24,25. 
As in Lopez, where the case turns on credibility of the 
witnesses, such evidence is of great value to the trier of fact, 
and clearly is admissible under URE 404(b), and Lopez.2 
II. The conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct is 
admissible under URE 608(b) for impeachment purposes. 
Impeachment evidence is admissible under URE 608(b) if it goes 
to credibility, even though it introduces evidence which would 
otherwise be inadmissible. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991). 
Parrish appears to concede this is the law on the subject in 
his brief, but argues that the prior conviction is not impeaching, 
and thus, not admissible. 
This argument ignores the duty of the finder of fact to weigh 
evidence and determine the value it should be given in reference to 
2
 Parrish argues that Lopez is distinguishable because the 
evidence in Lopez was directly contrary to the defendant's 
testimony, where in the case presently before the court, the 
evidence is not directly in conflict. 
The question of how compelling impeachment evidence is goes to 
the weight to be accorded particular evidence, not the 
admissibility of the evidence. Whether the trier of fact chooses 
to accept the evidence as impeachment of the defendant is within 
their province, but the rules clearly allow the prosecution the 
opportunity to present such impeachment. 
Defendant is not denied the opportunity to explain the 
circumstances of the prior incident and to reduce the effect of the 
impeaching testimony or questioning. 
See also. Infra, Argument section II. 
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other evidence presented. Because evidence is subject to varying 
interpretations does not mean it is inadmissible. Parrish 
correctly points out that a conviction for disorderly conduct could 
cover a potentially large area of conduct, some of which would not 
be impeaching. But some of the prohibited conduct clearly could 
cast doubt on Parrish's assertion that he had never beaten his 
wife. 
Parrish also argues that because the City presented no 
evidence to indicate which type of behavior under the disorderly 
conduct ordinance he was convicted of, the conviction itself is not 
impeaching. Under the plain terms of URE 608 (b) , the City was 
precluded from presenting evidence of the type of conduct the 
conviction was based on. The rule clearly bars the use of 
extrinsic evidence to prove the misconduct.3 The City is limited 
to the answer Parrish gave on the question. Parrish was still 
allowed the opportunity to argue to the court the broad nature of 
the statute or to testify as to the precise behavior the conviction 
was based on. 
Clearly, the question of the prior conviction's value as 
impeachment evidence is a question of the weight of the evidence, 
not the admissibility of it. 
3
 The City would not be allowed to use extrinsic evidence 
to prove the kind of misconduct alleged, and thus, would be "stuck" 
with the defendant's answer, unless of course the defendant 
attempted to explain away the prior conviction or minimize its 
import, in which case the City would be allowed to further probe 
the details of the incident through extrinsic evidence. See State 
v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990). 
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III. The probative value of defendant's prior conviction for 
disorderly conduct outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice and is 
therefore admissible. 
Even though evidence regarding a defendant's prior conviction 
is admissible under 404(b), it must also meet the requirements of 
Rule 403. O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701. 
In O'Neil the court noted several factors to be weighed in 
determining the probative value of evidence as opposed to the 
danger for unfair prejudice. These include: 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence will probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
O'Neil at 701. 
In assessing these factors in the case before them, the court 
concluded that the trial court had acted reasonably in allowing the 
prior conviction. Specifically the court noted that a conviction 
is the strongest evidence of a crime, that the prior crime and the 
charged crime were very similar in nature, that three years has 
passed from the prior conviction and thus the new charge was close 
in time, and that although there was other evidence, the prior 
conviction was not barred simply because the state had other 
evidence. 
Similarly, in Parrish's case, the evidence complained of is a 
prior conviction based on similar events, a domestic dispute. 
Also, the time between events was minimal, and much less than three 
9 
years. Finally, and perhaps most important, Parrish's case was 
tried to the bench. Thus, there was no danger of overmastering 
hostility from a jury. 
In light of these factors, it is clear the trial court acted 
reasonably in determining that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
IV. The admission of the defendant's prior conviction was 
harmless. 
It is well-settled law that an appellate court will not 
reverse a decision of a trial court even where error exists if the 
error is harmless. Admission of prior bad acts is harmless where 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent 
the admission of the prior bad act. State v. Feather stone. 781 
P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
In the case at hand, it is clear that the admission of the 
prior conviction was harmless, as the trial judge did not even 
consider it in his determination of the case. In determining the 
credibility of the witnesses the court focused on completely 
separate portions of the testimony, not even considering whether or 
not the prior conviction was impeaching, but determining the 
defendant was not credible on a completely different basis, 
involving other factual discrepancies. T. at p. 27,28. 
Based on the very clear nature of the court's ruling, there is 
no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome without the 
10 
evidence of the prior conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City requests 
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed and the appeal of 
defendant denied. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1994. 
)D J. 
ASSISTAN' 
ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Todd J. Godfrey, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be delivered to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to Rebecca C. Hyde, Attorney 
for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, on this 7j£> day of May, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 1 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 2 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 3 
12 
703 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 403 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements 
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of 
the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court. 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Pre-
liminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by 
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). 
In making its determination it is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privi-
leges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of 
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or 
subject to*, the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility 
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of 
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other prelimi-
nary matters shall be so conducted when the interests 
of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and 
so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, 
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become sub-
ject to cross-examination as to other issues in the 
case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not 
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury 
evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party 
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another 
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, 
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or 
recorded statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party 
may require the introduction at that time of any 
other part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought in fairness to be considered contempora* 
neously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts, 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial juw 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judi-
cial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as 
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor 
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notifica-
tion, the request may be made after judicial notice 
has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceed-
ing, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as con-
clusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not 
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence 
of the presumed fact is more probable than its exis-
tence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions 
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is 
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If 
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither 
presumption applies. 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a pre-
sumption respecting a fact which is an element of a 
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with fed-
eral law. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS 
LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissi-
ble; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth-
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, stat-
ute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in 
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
miclonHinor thp inrv nr hv rnnsidpratinns of undue 
Rule 404 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 704 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other 
crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of character is not admis-
sible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a per-
tinent trait of character offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a perti-
nent trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the 
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show ac-
tion in conformity therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 405. Methods of proving character. 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which 
evidence of character or a trait of character of a per-
son is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opin-
ion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct In cases in 
which character or a trait of character of a person is 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of that person's 
conduct. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice. 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine 
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is 
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in confor-
mity with the habit or routine practice. 
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures. 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent mea-
sures when offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compro-
mise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising 
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to 
accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was dis-
puted as to either validity or amount, is not admissi-
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made 
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissi-
ble. This rule does not require the exclusion of any 
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. 
This rule also does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a con-
tention of undue delay, or proving an effort to ob-
struct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Rule 409. Payment of medical and similar ex-
penses. 
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to 
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned 
by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for 
the injury. 
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discus-
sions, and related statements. 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence 
of the following is not, in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding, admissible against the defendant who made 
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
( l ) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any 
proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure or comparable state proce-
dure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea 
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authority which do not result in a plea of guilty 
or which result in a plea of guilty later with-
drawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any 
proceeding wherein another statement made in the 
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been 
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be 
considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a 
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if 
the statement was made by the defendant under oath, 
on the record and in the presence of counsel. 
Rule 411. Liability insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured 
against liability is not admissible upon the issue 
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise 
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of evidence of insurance against liability when of-
fered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, 
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a wit-
ness. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 412. [Reserved.] 
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES. 
Rule 501. Privileges recognized. 
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the 
United States and the State of Utah, no person shall 
have a privilege to withhold evidence except as pro-
vided by these or other rules adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court or by existing statutory provisions 
not in conflict with them. 
(Amended effective April 15, 1992.) 
Rule 502. Husband-wife. 
(a) Criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceed-
ing, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife. 
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would be precluded from testifying be received for 
these purposes. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any 
party, including the party calling the witness. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of 
witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of charac-
ter. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or repu-
tation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evi-
dence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character 
is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or repu-
tation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific in-
stances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, how-
ever, in the discretion of the court, if probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on 
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the 
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which charac-
ter the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or 
by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of 
the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-in-
crimination when examined with respect to matters 
which relate only to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any mo-
tive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the 
witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of convic-
tion of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the ac-
cused has been convicted of a crime shall be ad-
mitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which the witness 
was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted 
if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this 
rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten 
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of 
the release of the witness from the confinement im-
posed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of jus-
tice, that the probative value of the conviction sup-
ported by specific facts and circumstances substan-
tially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi-
dence of a conviction more than ten years old as cal-
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the 
use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate 
of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not ad-
missible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been 
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of re-
habilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, 
and that person has not been convicted of a subse-
quent crime which was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction 
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile 
adjudications is generally not admissible under this 
rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case al-
low evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness 
other than the accused if conviction of the offense 
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evi-
dence is necessary for a fair determination of the is-
sue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an ap-
peal therefrom does not render evidence of a convic-
tion inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an ap-
peal is admissible. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions. 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on 
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of 
showing that by reason of their nature the witness' 
credibility is impaired or enhanced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and 
presentation. 
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise rea-
sonable control over the mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for 
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless con-
sumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from ha-
rassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examina-
tion should be limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the credibil-
ity of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of 
discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as 
if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should 
not be used on the direct examination of a witness 
except as may be necessary to develop the witness' 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be 
permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a 
hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identi-
fied with an adverse party, interrogation may be by 
leading questions. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory. 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' 
memory for the purpose of testifying, either 
(1) while testifying, or 
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discre-
tion determines it is necessary in the interests of 
justice, 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing pro-
duced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine 
the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence 
*u«ort "A^TAno wViirVi rolnrp to thp testimonv of the 
